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INTRODUCTION 
History will look back at June 2, 2003 as an important moment in 
American media policy making.  On that day, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) voted controversially to relax 
broadcast ownership limits after completing a mandatory review of its 
regulations.1  It was not a routine set of rule changes, but a striking 
change in the structure of the media system.  The decision opened 
up cross-media ownership in the same market, inviting newspapers 
and broadcasters to operate under one roof in every major city.  It 
also permitted a substantially increased media concentration in local 
                                                          
 ∗ Ben Scott served as a legislative fellow in telecommunications policy in the 
office of Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) from June 2003 through May 2004.  
He is a doctoral student in the Institute of Communications Research, University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  The author would like to acknowledge the exceptional 
work of his colleagues on the staff of Congressman Sanders. 
Much of the information provided in this essay was the result of Mr. Scott's first-
hand knowledge of events acquired while working with Congressman Sanders.  The 
Congressman played a leadership role in the debate over media ownership in 2003, a 
role which placed his staff in the midst of a highly detailed and lengthy legislative 
process.  As a result, Mr. Scott was a participant in many internal staff meetings, 
briefing sessions, and inter-office communications which tracked and influenced the 
various legislative vehicles as they advanced through the Congress. 
 1. See Stephen Labaton, Regulators Ease Rules Governing Media Ownership, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1 (reporting a split, party-line vote in which the three 
Republican members of the FCC voted in favor of the changes and the two 
Democratic commissioners dissented). 
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and national television markets, tilting market conditions to favor 
larger firms and conglomerates.  The new rules would permit one 
company in one city to own three television (“TV”) stations, eight 
radio stations, the daily newspaper, and the cable system.  In his 
dissenting statement, Commissioner Michael Copps called it “the 
granddaddy of all reviews.  It sets the direction for how the next 
review will get done and for how the media will look for many years 
to come.”2 
Public response to the new rules was overwhelmingly negative,3 
and, in turn, congressional response’ was swift and vocal.  Through 
the final six months of 2003, in one of the most bitterly divided 
congressional sessions in recent memory,4 a campaign was waged to 
reverse the rule changes made by the FCC.5  Remarkably, the policies 
and regulations which shape the media system became political issues 
for the American people.6  Arguably, this had not happened for 
seventy years since the FCC was formed and the modern system of 
broadcast governance was established by the Communications Act of 
1934.7  Even more remarkably, it was not a partisan effort.  From 
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS)8 and the National Rifle Association 
(“NRA”)9 to Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT)10 and 
                                                          
 2. Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, dissenting, Regarding the 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, at 4 (June 1, 2003) [hereinafter Statement of Copps], available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A9.pdf. 
 3. See Tom Shales, Michael Powell and the FCC:  Giving Away the Marketplace of 
Ideas, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at C01 (describing the extensive opposition to the 
rule changes by a wide-ranging number of individuals and organizations). 
 4. See Helan Dewar, Democrats Forced to Work on Margins, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 
2003, at A06 (discussing the absence of partisanship in Congress as setting the stage 
for an even more bitter session in 2004). 
 5. See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA 252-295 
(2004) (discussing the uprising of 2003 in opposition to the ownership rules). 
 6. John Nichols, Congress Rebuffs the FCC, THE NATION, Aug. 18, 2003, at 36 
(describing the organization of grassroots campaigns in opposition to the FCC rule 
change). 
 7. See 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000).  
See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND 
DEMOCRACY:  THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993) 
(describing the contest between the early broadcasting corporations, the 
government, the public, and a coalition of public interest advocates over how the 
broadcast spectrum would be regulated by the government in the early days of 
radio). 
 8. See John Nichols & Robert W. McChesney, Standing Up to the FCC, THE 
NATION, June 23, 2003, at 5 (reporting Senator Lott’s statement that “[a] lot of 
Republicans, in fact, probably most of the Republicans in Congress, would not agree 
with this decision.”). 
 9. See Thane Peterson, Why the FCC Needs a New Chief, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 8, 
2003, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2003/nf2003098_6743_ 
db028. htm (noting the NRA’s opposition to the rule changes) (on file with the 
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MoveOn.org,11 the entire political spectrum was represented in a 
strange-bedfellows coalition of opposition. 
But, from a longer term perspective of media policy making, the 
second of June was not a wildly aberrant moment in U.S. media 
regulation, though it was an abrupt change of pace.  Nor did the 
ruling necessarily have to become the political catalyst that it did, 
knocking over a row of dominoes that awakened the American public 
and its Congress in dramatic fashion.  In retrospect, it appears, the 
day of the vote was a flashpoint where the political objectives of 
media policy most recently reaffirmed by the architects of the 
Telecommunications Act of 199612 collided with the sensibilities 
(political and otherwise) of the American public.  Simply put, the 
direction of communications policy was leading steadily to the 
concentration of media control in the hands of a few large 
corporations.  The American people and a majority of their 
representatives concluded that it was not such a good idea.  The 
conflict produced the most notable congressional battle over media 
policy in generations. 
Why did it happen in 2003?  How and why was the congressional 
move to reverse the rule changes sustained?  How and why did it 
ultimately stall?  Will the issue return to the fray in the future?  These 
are the questions at issue in the comments that follow.  In distilled 
form, the primary arguments that will seek to offer some answers are:  
(1) the 2003 debate over media ownership marks an important 
publicizing of media regulation as a political issue; (2) the power 
politics of the federal regulatory process and policies that favor 
deregulation and corporate interests are now opposed by legitimate 
counter-forces, serious scrutiny of the process, and a policy agenda of 
public service and accountability; (3) the political story in this contest 
is not exclusively the emergence of grassroots pressure which leveled 
the playing field in media policy-making, but also the politics of a 
powerful minority that denied public and congressional majorities; 
and (4) despite failing to achieve legislative results, public interest 
media policy has captured public momentum and congressional 
                                                          
American University Law Review). 
 10. See John Nichols & Robert W. McChesney, FCC:  Public Be Damned, THE 
NATION, June 2, 2003, at 5 (noting that Representative Saunders and others 
circulated a letter to Democratic congressmen asking the FCC to postpone the vote 
on the rule changes and seek additional public comment). 
 11. See id. (describing that this web based advocacy organization is urging its 
“media corps” to protest the FCC’s vote on the rule changes). 
 12. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104. 110 Stat. 56 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). 
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attention to such a remarkable degree that legislators will certainly 
continue to pursue a populist agenda on ownership as well as other 
media issues. 
I. FRAMING THE MEDIA OWNERSHIP DEBATE 
As in most legislative clashes, the media ownership debate was 
about conflicting policy objectives.  Quite typically, this policy conflict 
was played out through a series of political maneuvers as members of 
Congress jockeyed for position in the legislative process, worked to 
attract and shape media attention, curried favor with interest groups, 
negotiated pressures within their party structures, and marshaled 
public pressure to bring support to their side of the cause.  All of this 
was done in hopes of winning a legislative result.  Because the 108th 
Congress is marked by extreme partisanship, it is tempting to suggest 
(as some have) that this debate was only about politics, that there 
were no policy ideas beneath the opposition’s attack and that it was 
purely a counter-factual campaign against the FCC that happened to 
serve political purposes.13  It is true that the political climate dictated 
the manner in which Congress reacted to the June 2 decision.  It 
confused and shrouded the matter in partisan acrimony on Capitol 
Hill, and it ultimately led to an outlandish compromise worked out 
by Republicans.  But, it would be a mistake to conclude this was the 
primary meaning of the contest.  In fact, it would miss the most 
significant development in media policy making in generations:  the 
genesis of a new set of policy ideas to serve public interest media 
objectives supported by a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers and 
citizens. 
The emergence of these new principles of policy making to 
challenge the status quo stands in contrast to the scant opposition of 
the past.14  For decades, there has been one dominant set of policies 
driving governance of the media system:  gradual deregulation, free 
market economics, and the reduction of direct public accountability.  
The prevailing idea has been to use the FCC’s regulatory powers to 
set and reset market conditions over time to favor large, vertically 
integrated firms.15  Producing market efficiencies has been conflated 
                                                          
 13. See Jube Shriver, Jr., et al., FCC Ruling Puts Rivals on the Same Wavelength; Public 
Opinion, Political Self-Interest Spur Many in Congress to Unite Against New Media Rules, 
L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A1 (suggesting that special interest groups such as the 
NRA and NOW influenced the political approach). 
 14. See generally HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION (2000) 
(tracing the role of the federal government as the guardian of public interest during 
the developmental periods of the broadcast industry). 
 15. Although it may appear that deregulation cedes public control to the forces 
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with the goal of serving the public interest.  Other policy solutions 
have been basically off the legislative table, just as the entire issue has 
been off the public radar.  This issue has rarely been judged 
politically significant by the usual conveners of public discussion—the 
news media, political parties, and educators—and most people are 
unaware of even the basic facts of media regulation.  A June 2002 
survey demonstrated that only thirty-one percent of Americans were 
aware that the broadcast airwaves are owned by the public, and 
eighty-nine percent were unaware that broadcasters receive their 
station licenses for free in exchange for public service.16 
Yet, when the FCC opened its biennial review of the broadcast 
ownership rules in the fall of 2002, the political climate on the issue 
changed.  The standard deregulatory agenda met with stiff resistance.  
Further, a set of ideas long advocated by only a handful of public 
interest groups and academics percolated to the surface across the 
political spectrum.  This opposition put forward three simple claims:  
(1) control over the media system was already in the hands of too few; 
(2) the FCC should not permit further concentration of ownership; 
and (3) Congress should reevaluate how the public regulates its 
media system to find ways to better serve the interests of the people.17  
These concepts had enormous resonance for millions of Americans 
for a broad assortment of reasons, and became the foundation of 
what may become a new congressional policy platform.  Remarkably, 
all three would hold together and retain bipartisan support 
throughout the hotly contested political fight. 
Precisely why this happened at this moment in time is unknown, 
but a few contributing factors can be identified.  First, it was the 
                                                          
of the market, it is worthwhile to point out that this is a misnomer.  The broadcasting 
industry is built on public grants of monopoly spectrum rights.  Licenses are 
administered strictly or loosely, in ways that favor some industry players over others.  
Loose regulation is not deregulation; it chooses winners and losers just as surely as 
strict regulation.  It unleashes market forces that have very predictable results:  
consolidation and conglomeration.  Deregulation, when used in this essay, should be 
interpreted to mean regulation that favors players with natural market advantages 
such as size, capital, and vertical integration of production and distribution facilities.  
See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 146-59 (2000) 
(clarifying the nature of the current media deregulation as favoring existing large 
media corporations rather than promoting competition). 
 16. See ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, POLITICAL STANDARD—NATIONWIDE 
SURVEY FINDS THAT MOST AMERICANS SUPPORT FREE AIR TIME, DON’T REALIZE THE 
PUBLIC OWNS THE AIRWAVES (June 2002), at http://www.bettercampaigns.org/ 
standard/display.php?StoryID=238 (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (providing the results of a poll conducted by the 
Pew Research Foundation). 
 17. See Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 9 (illustrating the potential problems 
of the FCC’s decision, and noting the problems that have already occurred in radio 
ownership since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
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initial review conducted during the George W. Bush administration.  
The White House made plain its desire for the accelerated 
dismantling of government controls in the media marketplace.18  
Consequently, the review which opened in September 2002 seemed 
likely to be a departure from the beaten path of gradual 
deregulation.  Several large media companies filed comments with 
the FCC arguing that ownership rules should be totally eliminated.19 
Second, some of the regulations made during the previous review 
had been vacated or remanded by the courts.20  This led many to 
believe that radical change was necessary to satisfy new legal 
requirements. 
Third, the FCC’s Chairman, Michael Powell, held only a single 
public hearing on the matter.21  This prompted the minority 
commissioners, led by Michael Copps, to begin touring the country 
to speak at a series of highly publicized, well attended, and unofficial 
hearings.22 
Fourth, the American media system was experiencing a crisis in 
confidence directly linked to deregulatory economics.  The 
deregulation of the radio industry in 1996 seemed to have gone 
wrong thus permitting Clear Channel to explode from forty stations 
to more than 1200, and precipitating a decline in local control over 
programming.23  FCC Chairman Powell, testifying before the Senate 
Commerce Committee, conceded that he was “concerned about 
                                                          
 18. See Nichols & McChesney, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that the Bush 
administration applauded Chairman Powell’s decision to hold the June 2, 2003 vote). 
 19. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Media Seek to End Ownership Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 
2003, at A8 (identifying the commenting companies as Viacom, General Electric, and 
Fox Entertainment Group). 
 20. See Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding 
that the local ownership rule is overall constitutional; however, the definition of 
“voices” is “arbitrary and capricious,” thus remanding the rule to the FCC); see also 
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating 
the FCC’s decision not to rescind or amend the National Television Station 
Ownership (“NTSO”) Rule or the Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership (“CBSO”) Rule, 
remanding the retainment of the NTSO to the FCC, and repealing the CBSO).  
Notably, the court did not rule that the ownership regulations could not be justified.  
It ruled that they had not been justified.  Id. at 1051.  This is not surprising, given that 
the FCC, as mandated by the 1996 Act, was instructed to thoroughly review and 
justify its ownership rules every two years.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111-12 (2003).  This pace of study is arguably 
unsustainable by any federal agency and is considered by many lawmakers to be a 
mistake. 
 21. See Nichols & McChesney, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that Chairman Powell 
declined to participate in several other unofficial hearings that other FCC 
commissioners attended). 
 22. Peterson, supra note 9. 
 23. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 9. 
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media concentration, particularly in radio.”24  Perhaps more visible, 
high profile journalists were publicly expressing their alarm that 
economic pressures were reducing the quality of the American news 
media and degrading the quality of the public debate.25 
Finally, in the early months of 2003, the country prepared and 
began a controversial war in Iraq, an event which sparked criticism 
over the quality and diversity of media coverage.26  As a result, there 
was a great deal more than the usual inside-the-Beltway hue and cry 
when the June 2003 ruling began to loom on the horizon. Perennial 
public interest advocates like Consumers Union, Center for Digital 
Democracy, and the Consumer Federation of America were no 
longer alone in contesting the FCC.  Beside them stood unlikely 
partners such as the NRA, Parents Television Council, and the 
National Council of Churches.  These organizations launched a 
highly successful effort to educate concerned citizens and direct 
attention to the FCC proceeding.  By June 2, over 750,000 individual 
petitions reached the FCC, asking the Commissioners to eschew 
further media concentration.27 
Despite the opposition’s visibility, the central message conveyed by 
that media attention was limited to stopping the FCC from loosening 
ownership limits.  The purpose of advocating this position and the 
expanded outlook of their policy objectives remained murky.  The 
unified call for public service was blurred by the various priorities of 
the different groups. 
Consequently, when the June ruling prompted a further 
intensification of the outcry and a boiling congressional backlash, but 
not a clear policy alternative, some interpreted the contest as a 
political attack by an embattled minority, not a legitimate policy 
challenge.  For example, The Christian Science Monitor suggested that 
basically this fight was about lawmakers protecting local media voices 
because they could exert more influence on them during elections.28  
Additionally, a Wall Street Journal editorial portrayed the ownership 
                                                          
 24. Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, Media Democracy’s Moment, THE 
NATION, Feb. 24, 2003, at 17. 
 25. See generally LEONARD DOWNIE JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE 
NEWS:  AMERICAN JOURNALISM IN PERIL (2002) (book-length media critique by two 
Washington Post editors); INTO THE BUZZSAW:  LEADING JOURNALISTS EXPOSE THE MYTH 
OF A FREE PRESS (Kristina Borjesson, ed. 2002 ). 
 26. See, e.g., Robert S. Pritchard, The Pentagon is Fighting—and Winning—the Public 
Relations War, USA TODAY MAG., July 1, 2003, at 12 (describing the criticism that the 
Pentagon only allowed a positive portrayal of the war through embedding journalists 
with soldiers). 
 27. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 7. 
 28. Tuning Out the FCC, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 2003, at 10. 
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debate as a covert effort by Democrats to suppress conservative radio 
talk shows.29  Critics heightened misperceptions throughout the 
debate claiming that the public simply did not understand the 
technical and legal details of media regulation, and that members of 
Congress saw a political opportunity to champion a popular issue by 
manipulating public viewpoints.  Viacom chief Mel Karmazin said this 
about the backlash:  “We’re troubled by it, it’s political, it’s not 
motivated by fact.”30  Chairman Powell commented in June that critics 
had a “dramatic misunderstanding of the substance of what was at 
issue,”31 and he concluded later in the fall that “people ran an outside 
political campaign against the commission,” a campaign which 
ignored the facts.32 
This set of claims, purporting that the ownership debate had more 
to do with political chicanery than a good-faith response to the facts 
of policy making, are misguided.  There are two central factors which 
support this point; an unshakeable bipartisanship, and the serious 
congressional scrutiny of the policy objectives. 
Undeniably, the coalition began bipartisan and remains bipartisan.  
It is not a creation of the Democrats, nor is it motivated by 
ideological rancor.  The perceived likelihood of a reduction in 
localism, diversity, and public control over the media system is 
unpopular across the political spectrum.  If this was a political 
campaign against the Republican administration and the FCC, it 
would be hard to explain why so many Republicans remained 
supportive of proposals to roll back the FCC’s decision. 
The politics to which they are responding belong to their 
constituents.  Columnist William Safire summed it up in the days 
before the decision:  “The concentration of power—political, 
corporate, media, cultural—should be anathema to conservatives. 
The diffusion of power through local control, thereby encouraging 
individual participation, is the essence of federalism and the greatest 
expression of democracy.”33  Former Senator Jesse Helms of North 
Carolina seconded these sentiments in a letter to Senator Trent Lott 
on the eve of a key vote.  He wrote, “I can think of no reason to allow 
                                                          
 29. The Stop Rush Campaign, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2003, at A10. 
 30. Todd Shields, Nets Try to Regain Ground, MEDIAWEEK.com, July 28, 2003, at  
http://www.mediaweek.com/mediaweek/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content
_ id=1942827 (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 31. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2003, at C1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. William Safire, The Great Media Gulp, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A24 
(emphasis added). 
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fewer companies to own more and more of the media!  Media 
ownership is a bipartisan issue that commands a close review by 
Democrats and Republicans.”34 
Senator Lott took this message to the Senate floor to dispel any 
notion that reevaluating media deregulation was politically 
motivated.  In his remarks on September 11, 2003 he emphasized the 
two most significant elements of the bipartisan coalition as evidenced 
by comments made by both the AFL-CIO and the NRA.  “Here is an 
interesting thing about this alliance.  This is a diverse group, and they 
generally represent people, individuals.”35  If indeed there was a 
political campaign involved in the ownership debate, it was 
engineered by conservatives and liberals making up a broad cross-
section of the American polity. 
The idea that the campaign was without a basis in fact or without 
policy counterproposals is betrayed by the sentiments and actions of 
its congressional leaders.  The rejection of the FCC’s rules makes 
little sense without a clear intent to revisit the principles and methods 
of public media regulation.  This conflict marks the reversal of a 
consistent policy trend toward deregulation and the point of 
departure for new thinking on public service controls in the 
marketplace.  Any rollback of the FCC rules which was not followed 
by further legislative inquiry would amount merely to resetting the 
clock to June 1 and resuming the policy directives that produced 
June 2.  Moreover, it would leave the FCC in a serious mess, faced 
with legal remands, review deadlines, and an uncertain directive from 
Congress.  The baseline conclusion is clear; the effort to reverse the 
rule changes was aimed at scrutinizing the method and changing the 
policy which produced the changes. 
Members of Congress have already begun the process of studying 
and shaping the contours of a new, bipartisan media policy platform 
of local media control, ownership limits, and public accountability.  
The desire to roll back the rule changes was not based on longing for 
the pre-June 2 world.  Instead, it was based on the understanding that 
deregulation policies were failing and needed principled 
reconsideration with new policy goals.  Senator McCain, in the 
September 11 debate on media ownership, stated that, “[w]hether we 
agree with them or not, the FCC’s actions are a direct result of the 
                                                          
 34. See Letter from former Senator Jesse Helms to Senator Trent Lott (Sept. 15, 
2003), at http://www.mediareform.net/multimedia/Helms.pdf (on file with the 
American University Law Review).  Senator Helms’ to Senator Lott was widely 
circulated among Congressional offices. 
 35. 149 CONG. REC. S11,389 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Lott). 
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direction given to it by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which should have been called ‘Leave No Lobbyist Behind Act 
of 1996.’”36 Senator McCain concluded that, “[i]n short, if the 
Congress is unsatisfied with the result of the FCC review, it should 
step in to provide new direction.”37  Senator Lott agreed, replying in 
the same debate; “I share a lot of [Senator McCain’s] concerns and 
questions.  I know from my discussions with him, and he knows, we 
need to do more in this area. . . .”38  Representative Bernie Sanders 
was even more specific, arguing that “[r]olling back the national TV 
ownership cap is the first step in this fight. . . .  [It] should be 
considered a first step in the larger movement to reform the media 
system and set the FCC on a regulatory course that serves the public 
interest not big media companies.”39 
These sentiments explain why Senator McCain’s Commerce 
Committee held eight full committee hearings on the topic of media 
ownership in 2003.40  Senator McCain later referenced the 
development of his thinking over the course of the year by saying, 
“[a]s a result, I have come to believe that stringent, but reasonable, 
limits on media ownership may very well be appropriate.”41  The 
record demonstrates that Congress intends to revisit the issue and 
craft new policies.  This interest explains the growth of the Public 
Broadcasting Caucus to 100 members and the formation of the Sex & 
Violence in the Media Caucus—both bipartisan working groups on 
media issues in the House of Representatives.  In addition, members 
of Congress are planning to conduct town meetings in their districts 
in states like Vermont, California, and New York. 
Congress was not preparing to render the FCC powerless and 
without direction.  The legislative move to reject the June 2003 
changes to the media ownership rules was indicative of the first steps 
in the formation of a new policy agenda.  More work was 
forthcoming, as by no means did Congress write or debate a 
                                                          
 36. 149 CONG. REC. S11,385 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
McCain). 
 37. Id. 
 38. 149 CONG. REC. S11,387 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Lott). 
 39. Press Release, Representative Bernie Sanders, Sanders Calls Rollback of FCC 
Rules “First Step in Larger Movement” (July 23, 2003), at http://bernie.house.gov/ 
documents/releases/20030723184339.asp (on file with the American University Law 
Review) (quotations omitted). 
 40. See U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 
HEARINGS, at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/hearings/index.cfm?cong=108& 
sessn=1&subc=58 (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) (listing subject matter and dates of all 
full committee hearings). 
 41. 149 CONG. REC. S11,385 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
McCain). 
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comprehensive policy proposal.  But, it legitimately placed on the 
table the idea that public service regulation was not equivalent to 
market efficiencies, and might well be in conflict with them.  This 
idea alone marks a turning point as Congress is now inclined to 
pursue untried methods of media regulation by seeking new policies 
and a better balance between market forces and public rights.  It is 
quite fair to state that the contest over whether a rule rejection would 
succeed marked a clash between two oppositional policy priorities; 
not a policy-less political attack on the status quo. 
It is then also fair to ask, if politics did not constitute the driving 
force behind the opposition, what role did they play?  The role of 
politics was indeed a powerful one, but it was primarily involved in 
guiding the process, not the substance, of the debate.  Opponents of 
the FCC sought to keep legislative vehicles for rejecting the rule 
changes alive for as long as possible, a difficult task in a Congress led 
by FCC supporters and the policies of deregulation.  They used the 
political advantages of broad public support, an unlikely bipartisan 
coalition, and the attractive simplicity of the message of the “public 
versus big media.”  Conversely, supporters of the rules used the 
political power of leadership to block legislation and to leverage 
targeted industry lobbying.  In addition, GOP leaders pressured 
conservative members to withdraw from the coalition, and they 
worked to whittle down the winnable objectives of the reformers to 
only one of the rule changes. 
There is a good case to be made that the most impressive political 
power demonstrated in the media ownership debate was not the 
force which brought the issue to public attention and onto the 
congressional agenda.  The most impressive political power was the 
force which defeated the rollback—overcoming the weaknesses in the 
ruling, repelling the major elements of reform in every shape they 
took (despite majority support), engineering a compromise, and 
ultimately denying a move toward new policy interests.  The short-
term success of the FCC’s defenders was very near total as a result of 
their aggressive political tactics. 
I suggest there is a great deal of evidence to support this 
contention.  For example, the FCC and its supporters defended a 
record containing substantial flaws in its process and method.  
Though Congress performed much of the review with a great deal of 
care, there are central elements that are intellectually indefensible.  
No matter which policy approach Congress preferred, 
methodological problems in the production of data sets and studies 
shaping the rules are difficult to ignore.  At the very least, they call for 
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further review and correction; a process wholly consistent with the 
objectives of the reformers and not inconsistent with the arguments 
supporting the ruling more generally.  Even if the Chairman’s 
primary arguments are conceded in their entirety (which they have 
not been),42 the presence of serious flaws in the logic, procedure, and 
analytical models used by the FCC would pose considerable problems 
for opponents of a rule reversal. 
The two dissenting commissioners issued lengthy reports 
articulating many of the rules’ problems.43  Consumer advocacy 
groups and public interest attorneys brought to light other 
problems.44  They later took these arguments before the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit where they won a stay on the 
implementation of the rules.45  The most troublesome problems 
included inadequate public hearings, constrained periods of public 
review, contradictions in the logic of the ruling, faulty assumptions, 
inconsistent application of principles, dubious interpretation of 
statistical results, and a disregard for critical comment and data in the 
evidentiary record. 
The present study does not purport to conduct a systematic review 
of the quality of the ruling, but it does seek to provide a few examples 
of the most egregious problems demonstrating the weaknesses that 
might reasonably justify Congress’s intervention.  Commissioner 
Copps wrote in his dissent:  “Good, sustainable rules are the result of 
an open administrative process and a serious attempt to gather all the 
relevant facts.  Bad rules and legal vulnerability result from an 
                                                          
 42. See Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, Regarding the 2002 Biennial 
Regulatory Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules 
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 
F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) (claiming that:  (1) Congress and the courts essentially 
mandated deregulatory rule changes; (2) digital media resulted in a dramatic 
expansion of media choices and eased the problems of scarcity and diversity; and (3) 
over-the-air broadcasting would not long survive without government granted market 
advantages). 
 43. Statement of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein, dissenting, Regarding the 
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 (June 1, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-235047A8.pdf; Statement of Copps, supra note 2. 
 44. See MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., ABRACADABRA! HOCUS-POCUS! 
MAKING MEDIA MARKET POWER DISAPPEAR WITH THE FCC’S DIVERSITY INDEX (2003) 
(discussing several problems with the FCC decision, including its flawed reasoning, 
faulty reliance on the diversity index and inconsistent logic), at http://cyberlaw. 
stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/mediabooke.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 45. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1 
(3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (finding that the proposed broadcast rules would cause 
irreparable harm and granting petitioner’s motion to stay the effective date). 
SCOTT.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 4/29/2004  6:55 PM 
2004] THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP 657 
opaque regulatory process and inadequate data. Unfortunately, 
today’s rules fall into the latter camp.”46  Data sets were 
predominantly proprietary and secretive.47  The FCC did not release 
the information to the public in a timely manner, despite a letter 
from fifteen senators requesting more transparency.48  Moreover, the 
FCC relied on discredited studies to make critical decisions.49  The 
FCC’s central arguments were flawed and contradictory. Specifically, 
Copps notes that the FCC prevented two of the top four TV stations 
in a market from merging on the grounds of guarding against undue 
concentration.  The FCC, however, permitted the merger of the top 
TV station and the monopoly newspaper, a consolidation far more 
likely to centralize control over news and information.50 
A July report issued by Consumers Union and the Consumer 
Federation of America noted serious flaws in the FCC’s “diversity 
index,” a tool used to analyze media markets.51  The report found that 
by applying this tool, which very oddly does not account for market 
share in New York City, the Shop at Home Incorporated TV and 
Dutchess Community College TV were considered more influential 
news sources than the New York Times.52  The report discovered 
similarly troubling anomalies in other markets.  The report judged 
the ruling harshly: 
The Media Ownership Order is riddled with contradictions, 
misstatements of empirical fact and unrealistic or unsupported 
                                                          
 46. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 5. 
 47. See John Dunbar, A Penchant for Secrecy:  Why is the FCC So Determined to Keep Key 
Data from the Public?, WELL CONNECTED, May 22, 2003, at http://www.openairwaves. 
org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=18 (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(criticizing the government’s reliance on private data and invocation of a protection 
order to keep the data secret). 
 48. See Press Release, Consumer’s Union, Two Important Developments in 
Debate Over the FCC’s Media Ownership Review:  Bipartisan Group of Key Senators 
Ask FCC for Full Disclosure Before Revising Media Rules—Small Business 
Administration’s Office of Advocacy Faults FCC for Not Properly Considering Impact 
on Small Businesses (Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Two Important Developments] 
(reporting that Senators Snowe, Dorgan, Hollings, Lott, Hutchison, Inouye, Wyden, 
Boxer, Nelson, Cantwell, Lautenberg, Collins, Murray, and Allard signed the letter 
sent to Chairman Powell on April 10, 2003), at http://www.consumersunion. 
org/telecom/media2-403.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 49. See generally DEAN BAKER, AFL-CIO DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPLOYEES, DEMOCRACY 
UNHINGED:  MORE MEDIA CONCENTRATION MEANS LESS PUBLIC DISCOURSE:  A CRITIQUE 
OF THE FCC STUDIES ON MEDIA OWNERSHIP (2002) (cataloguing the studies’ specific 
flaws, including failure to address the issue of bias in news broadcasts, failure to 
examine trends in news quality over time, and adoption of faulty assumptions), at 
http://www.dpeaflcio.org/pdf/FCC_Critique.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 50. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 13. 
 51. COOPER, supra note 44, at 4. 
 52. Id. 
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assumptions about market conditions.  The inconsistencies occur 
within the discussions of each rule, as well as between the 
arguments presented for each of the rules.  These inconsistencies 
and flaws result in an analytic framework that produces absurd 
results.53 
Public interest advocates elaborated on many of the problems in a 
brief filed with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.54 
Political backers of the ruling faced an even greater hurdle.  Quite 
simply, the effort to reverse the FCC ruling had majority support in 
Congress, as demonstrated on the record.  Both the House and the 
Senate passed rollback provisions in committee and in full roll call 
votes.  In each case, the vast majority of the Democrats lined up with 
a significant minority of the Republicans to secure passage, often by a 
wide margin.  Each highly publicized victory evidenced a rebuke of 
the FCC and a step toward a new media policy.  Nonetheless, through 
a series of procedural maneuvers and political tactics, each of the 
legislative vehicles which might have reversed some or part of the 
June decision was blocked.  In the end, all that remained was a 
compromise between Republicans that essentially ignored public 
outcry to reverse the entire FCC order, choosing instead to slightly 
modify one of the several rule changes.  Despite a Congressional 
majority, all that stands in the way of the rules going into effect is the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.55 
This is the most important story of the political and policy debates 
surrounding media ownership, though it is little told.  The White 
House and the congressional leaders of the Republican Party 
succeeded in deflecting the stated will of the Congress.  This is a 
remarkable state of affairs.  Only a small number of issues saw 
Congressional majorities and overwhelming public opinion fail to 
produce public law.  Arguably, this occurs only with critical issues 
with strong ideological divisions.  In the first session of the 108th 
Congress, this happened with efforts to rescind portions of the 
Patriot Act, efforts to legalize the reimportation of prescription drugs 
from Canada, and efforts to prevent the alteration of overtime wage 
rules.  Few issues garnered as much attention and support as these 
during the legislative year.  That they did not pass into law is an 
unfortunate statement about the democratic process in the Congress.  
                                                          
 53. Id. at 7. 
 54. Brief for Citizen Petitioners and Intervenors, Prometheus Radio Project v. 
FCC, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2003) (No. 03-3388), available at 
http://www.mediaaccess.org/CitizenPetitionersandIntervenorsBrief.pdf. 
 55. Prometheus Radio Project, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1. 
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But, it is also an indication of how media has become an important 
political issue. 
In summary, I reassert the following claims.  First, far more than 
politics motivated the opponents of the June rules.  The opponents 
had a clear policy objective to reverse the rules and pursue public 
interest media policy to guide future review and rule making in the 
direction of more substantial public service requirements and 
protections.  Second, far more than policy arguments lay behind the 
relatively successful defense of the FCC’s ruling in Congress.  As the 
following account will demonstrate, given the majority strength of the 
opposition and the deep flaws in the FCC’s ruling, it was the politics 
behind the FCC’s policies which allowed them to survive. 
II. THE POLITICAL BATTLE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Congress’s response to June 2 played out in three tracks.  The first 
was the standard route of legislative consideration, moving bills 
through the committee system.  When that was blocked, amendments 
were added to appropriations bills to attempt to achieve a rollback by 
preventing the FCC from using its funding to implement the rules.56  
Finally, members attempted to use a rare measure amounting to a 
congressional veto of the agency ruling.  This is permitted under the 
terms of a “resolution of disapproval,” a part of the Congressional 
Review Act of 1996 (“CRA”).57  Should it pass, it would nullify the 
June ruling entirely. 
There was both bipartisan and public support for each of these 
measures.  On two of the three legislative tracks, the House and 
Senate voted for passage, despite opposition from congressional 
leadership and the White House.58  The soundness of the policy of 
reversal and reconsideration of the FCC rules was not in question in 
the public.  A July survey conducted by the Pew Research Center 
demonstrated that the more people learned about the FCC’s new 
rules, the less they liked them.  Forty percent of those who knew 
nothing about the issue had a negative impression of the ruling.  
Fifty-seven percent of those who had some knowledge were 
displeased.  Of those who said they knew a lot about the FCC ruling, 
                                                          
 56. See Joseph C. Anselmo, Senate Committee Toughens Media Ownership Restirctions 
in Second Swipe at FCC, CQ WKLY., June 28, 2003, at 1627 (noting a strategy proposed 
by Senate leaders opposed to the new rules that would defeat the FCC authorization 
bill by  attaching amendments unpopular with the broadcasting industry). 
 57. Congressional Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868 
(codified as 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)). 
 58. Jacques Steinberg, House Panel Adds Voice to Opponents Of Media Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2003, at C1.  
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seventy percent felt negatively about it as compared to six percent 
who saw it as positive.59 
With this kind of public support, it was no surprise that on the 
occasions when Congress voted on these rules, the results endorsed a 
rollback by a wide margin.  That is not to say it ever had a good 
chance of becoming law.  This issue depended less on building 
majority support for a rule reversal than it did on whether Congress’s 
politics and procedures, which places huge power in the hands of the 
majority leadership, would allow such a policy to be realized.  The 
different legislative strategies and the extensive posturing were all 
political responses attempting to determine how to advance a policy 
that had majority support but lacked leadership consent. 
The first legislative response began in early April, before the FCC 
even issued its order.60  Initially, Congress focused its attention 
exclusively on the national broadcast ownership limits. The old rule, 
set in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, stated that one TV 
network could own and operate stations that reached no more than 
thirty-five percent of the nation’s TV households.61  The proposed 
new rule would raise that cap to forty-five percent.  This increase 
permitted large broadcast networks, particularly NBC, ABC, CBS, and 
FOX, to purchase stations run by affiliates.  It also legalized the 
acquisitions of Viacom and News Corp, both of whom exceeded the 
thirty-five percent limit in anticipation of a rule change. 
Two important groups opposed this rule change.  The first was the 
general public, evidenced by its 750,000 notices of disapproval.  The 
second group was smaller, but more influential, the National 
Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”).  NAB, largely representing 
regional and local broadcast chains, was generally pleased with the 
idea of loosening ownership caps.62  This organization felt, however, 
that a forty-five percent cap would tip the balance of power in the 
industry toward the networks and away from its primary 
                                                          
 59. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, STRONG OPPOSITION TO MEDIA CROSS-OWNERSHIP 
EMERGES:  PUBLIC WANTS NEUTRALITY AND PRO-AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW (2003), at 
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=188 (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 60. See Two Important Developments, supra note 48 (describing the letter sent by 
senators to Chairman Powell criticizing lack of proper note and comment period for 
the FCC’s proposed ownership rules). 
 61. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(c)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 104-104. 110 
Stat. 56. 
 62. See, e.g., Neal Hickey, Power Shift, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 
29-30 (noting that most ownership caps restricted the ability of local broadcast 
companies to cross-own television stations with radio stations or newspapers, or or 
limited the number of radio or television stations that a company could own in a 
given market). 
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constituents.63  If the networks owned more stations outright, it would 
be easier for them to exert influence over advertising rates and 
programming decisions for non-owned affiliates.64  NAB leaned on 
lawmakers to keep the national cap at thirty-five percent to avoid that 
outcome; even as they pressed Congress to endorse the FCC’s 
removal of the cross-ownership ban.65 
The House and Senate introduced companion bills with bipartisan 
support.66  Each kept the national broadcast cap at thirty-five percent, 
though the FCC had yet to change it.  In the House, Representative 
Richard Burr (R-NC), the Energy Commerce Committee’s Vice-
Chairman, and Representative John Dingell (D-MI), the ranking 
Democrat on the committee, introduced H.R. 2052, the Burr-Dingell 
bill, on May 9.67  Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the 
Appropriations Committee, and Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC), the 
ranking Democrat on the Commerce Committee, introduced the 
Stevens-Hollings bill on May 13.68  Both bills rapidly picked up 
cosponsors.  By the time the FCC actually raised the broadcast cap to 
forty-five percent, a tenth of the House and Senate was on record in 
support of bills to roll it back.  Directly after the ruling, over a dozen 
senators sponsored a resolution asking that the rules be rescinded on 
the grounds that both the process and the conclusions were badly 
flawed and contrary to the public interest.69 
On June 12, Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced a 
more comprehensive bill, H.R. 2462, which amounted to a legislative 
reversal of the entire FCC decision, not just the forty-five percent 
broadcast cap.70  This bill was designed to move beyond a debate over 
the broadcast cap.  Its supporters emphasized that the lifting of the 
cross-media ownership ban would have a much bigger impact on the 
character of the American media system than an increase in the 
broadcast ownership cap.  Supporters of H.R. 2052 argued that the 
expansion of network power in the television sector would result in 
                                                          
 63. See id. at 29 (reporting that NAB opposition to the lifting of this cap resulted 
in the defection from that organization of large media companies NBC, CBS, and 
Fox). 
 64. See id. (citing a number of examples of networks using their power to force 
programming decisions on local affiliates). 
 65. See id. (quoting NAB’s vice-president Dennis Wharton as opining that “the 
thirty-five-percent cap has been good for localism”). 
 66. H.R. 2052, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 67. H.R. 2052, 108th Cong. (amending the Communications Act of 1934 to 
preserve localism and diversity in television programming, prevent monopolies, and 
promote competition). 
 68. S. 1046, 108th Cong.  
 69. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 70. H.R. 2462, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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the decline of localism and diversity as national conglomerates took 
over programming decisions from local and regional owners.  H.R. 
2462 supported and extended that position.  If conglomerate 
ownership of the local television station was harmful to localism and 
diversity, certainly the conglomerate ownership of a local television 
station and a local newspaper and several local radio stations should 
be looked upon as even more harmful.  By the end of June, 
Representative Sanders had more than sixty cosponsors on his 
legislation, about half the number held by Burr-Dingell.71  Both bills 
had bipartisan support, though the more limited bill enjoyed a more 
balanced following of Republicans and Democrats.  At this point, it 
was widely thought that the GOP supporters favoring reversal of the 
FCC ruling would not look beyond the broadcast cap in their reform 
efforts. 
In short order, however, this assumption was disproved, and the 
debate took on a decidedly new cast.  Unlike his counterpart, 
Representative Billy Tauzin in the House, Senate Commerce 
Chairman John McCain determined that legislation on the media 
ownership rules deserved consideration in his committee.  He 
demonstrated that resolve by holding three hearings on media 
ownership before the full committee in May.72  He called all of the 
FCC commissioners before his committee on June 4 to explain their 
decision, where they were “greeted with lengthy and occasionally 
hostile questions.”73  Evidently he was dissatisfied with the answers.  
On June 19, Senator McCain held a markup on the Stevens-Hollings 
bill, even though he opposed it at that time.  Various senators 
amended the bill on a number of occasions.  Senator Dorgan offered 
the most important of these amendments; one that reinstated the 
ban on cross-ownership, with a provision exempting firms in small 
markets which could present evidence of financial hardship.74  
Senator McCain suggested another significant amendment; one that 
changed the language in section 202(h) of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.75  It clarified that section 202(h) was not a mandate for 
                                                          
 71. Patriotic Reading, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9, 2003, at A8.  
 72. Mike Sunnucks, Murdoch Makes Case Before McCain Committee, BUS. J., May 22, 
2003, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2003/05/19/daily 
52.html. 
 73. Ted Leventhal, Telecommunications—Senate Panel Weights Media Ownership 
Limits, CONGRESS DAILYAM, June 16, 2003, at http://nationaljournal.com/cgi-
bin/ifetch4?ENG+CONGRESS+7-cd0097+1091444-REVERSE+0+0+32520+F+1+1+1+ 
Leventhal+AND+PDf06f16f2003de06f16f2003 (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 74. Id. 
 75. S. 1264, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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deregulation, as the courts ruled and Chairman Powell  maintained, 
but rather a statement of congressional intent that the FCC was to 
loosen or tighten ownership rules as deemed necessary to serve the 
public interest.76  The bill was reported out of committee.77  This 
committee vote transformed the Stevens-Hollings bill.78  It now 
resembled the Sanders bill more than Burr-Dingell.  After the 
committee vote, Commissioner Copps called on Chairman Powell to 
stay the implementation of the rule changes in light of the Senate’s 
action.79 
This proved a pivotal turn of events.  It was one thing for 
Representative Sanders to introduce a comprehensive rollback bill in 
the House and pick up a handful of Republican cosponsors.  It was 
quite another for a similar bill to pass out of Senator McCain’s 
Commerce Committee with the support of Senators Ted Stevens, 
Trent Lott, Elizabeth Dole, and Olympia Snowe.  The congressional 
response to the June 2 ruling was no longer a targeted attack on the 
broadcast cap at the behest of the NAB.  It was a bipartisan reaction 
to public outrage that spoke to a much more sweeping agenda aimed 
not only at reversing ownership rules, but visiting deep inquiry upon 
the nature of media regulation in general. 
Public participants applauded the senators for the move to 
broaden the debate.  Tens of thousands of citizens were now 
contacting members of Congress on a regular basis, phoning in 
support for particular bills and instructions on particular votes.  On 
some occasions, offices received dozens of calls on the topic in a 
given day, an enormous number for most congressional offices; 
particularly on an issue that had never before resonated in popular 
politics. 
The NAB responded to the amending of Stevens-Hollings by 
reversing its position in the debate.80  They now endorsed the FCC 
ruling and began lobbying against any rule changes.  This reversal 
seemed to preclude any chance that the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee would mark up any media ownership 
legislation.  A spokesman for Representative Tauzin made the 
                                                          
 76. Id. § 4. 
 77. S. Rep. No. 108-140 (2003). 
 78. The committee vote was thirteen yeas to ten nays.  Id. 
 79. Press Release, FCC, FCC Commissioner Copps Calls on FCC to Stay Media 
Ownership Decision Pending Congressional Deliberation (June 19, 2003), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235628A1.pdf. 
 80. See Joseph C. Anselmo, Focus on Media Ownership Issue Takes Lawmakers by 
Surprise, CQ WKLY., July 12, 2003, at 1742-43 (noting the NAB’s disappointment at the 
retreat from a rule that would allow cross-ownership of newspapers and television 
stations in the same market, a rule that the NAB endorsed). 
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committee’s position clear in June:  “The media ownership issue has 
become a political soap opera.  Given the chance, Chairman Tauzin 
plans to cancel its run.”81  He was backed up in his intent to bottle the 
issue in committee by powerful House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.  
On July 9, Representative Delay said, “I do not think the FCC went far 
enough . . . .  We should be unregulating instead of regulating 
people’s right to own property and business.”82  Nonetheless, the 
departure of the NAB and the denunciation from Representatives 
Tauzin and DeLay did not cause the storm to blow over.  It 
intensified.  The public interest groups won a victory in the Senate 
Commerce Committee, and they redoubled organizing efforts. 
On July 15, Senators Dorgan and Lott, a most unlikely pairing, 
opened a second front by introducing a new measure; a 
congressional veto.83  Under the provisions of the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA), Congress could pass a “resolution of disapproval,” 
effectively nullifying any ruling by a federal agency.84  The CRA had 
been used only once before, and its chances of passing the Senate 
seemed slim.  However, it enjoyed certain advantages.  First, it was a 
simple message; total reversal.  It presented a standard bearer for 
organizing public pressure that was easy to understand.  The public 
pressure and media attention generated by the CRA threat would be 
used to drum up more support and momentum for the new, 
revamped Stevens-Hollings bill.  Second, the CRA did not suffer from 
the procedural problems that burdened a normal bill.  Even if 
Stevens-Hollings were to pass the Senate, which was by no means 
clear since Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) opposed its 
consideration on the Senate floor,85 the House seemed unlikely to 
move a similar bill through committee.86  Without Representative 
Tauzin’s acquiescence, there would be no future for Stevens-Hollings, 
despite the importance of its markup. 
The CRA resolution would not need approval from Senator Frist or 
Representative Tauzin.  According to the rules of the CRA, a 
                                                          
 81. Ted Leventhal, Telecommunications—FCC Media Rule’s Hill Opponents Vow To 
Keep Up Fight, CONGRESS DAILY, June 24, 2003, at http://nationaljournal.com/cgi-
bin/ifetch4?ENG+CONGRESS+7-cd0097+1098605-REVERSE+0+0+32746+F+1+1+1+ 
Leventhal+AND+PDf06f24f2003de06f24f2003 (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (quotations omitted). 
 82. Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743 (quotations omitted). 
 83. Congress Moves to Overturn New Media Ownership Rules, ONLINE NEWS HOUR, July 
16, 2003, at http://wwwpbs.org/newshour/media/media_watch/july-dec03/ 
fccresolution_9-1.html (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 84. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2004). 
 85. See Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743 (stating that Senator Frist, as of July 9, 
“had not yet considered scheduling of the bill”). 
 86. See Leventhal, supra note 81 (discussing Republican opposition to the bill). 
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resolution could be forcibly brought to the floor with a petition 
bearing the signatures of thirty senators.  As Stevens-Hollings had 
thirty-two cosponsors at that point, this seemed easily within reach.  
Moreover, if the Senate passed the CRA, it would not be referred to 
the House Energy and Commerce Committee like a typical Senate 
resolution.  It would stay at the Speaker of the House’s desk.  Though 
Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL) did not indicate that he would 
grant the measure a vote, it would certainly be much closer to the 
House floor than if it had to first bypass Representative Tauzin’s 
committee and then get the Speaker’s approval.  The CRA 
represented the possibility that a majority of members could execute 
an end-run around the GOP leadership. 
The introduction of the CRA provoked a rapid response.  
Newspaper publishers, network broadcasters, and the NAB turned up 
the lobbying pressure.  The steady flow of cosponsors to Stevens-
Hollings, Burr-Dingell, and the Sanders bill began to dry up as more 
cautious representatives opted to stand clear of the fray.  For the 
moment, Representative Tauzin served as an effective roadblock.  
According to the provisions of the CRA, the resolution would have to 
sit in the Commerce Committee for twenty calendar days before it 
could be discharged to the floor.  That deadline would expire during 
Congress’ August recess. September was presumed to be the next 
opportunity for further action on media ownership. 
Once again, however, the political pressure did not abate.  The 
following day, July 16, the issue spilled over into yet another avenue:  
the appropriations process.  The action returned to the House, where 
the appropriations bills were to be addressed first.  The strategy 
involved attaching a limitation amendment, also called a rider, to the 
Commerce, Justice, State (“CJS”) Appropriations Bill.87  The 
amendment would prohibit the FCC from using any appropriated 
funds to implement its June 2 rules, thus effectively blocking them for 
one fiscal year.  Unlike in the Energy and Commerce Committee, 
Chairman Bill Young (R-FL) could not refuse to consider the CJS 
Appropriations Bill, which like all appropriations measures is must-
pass legislation containing tens of billions of dollars in spending.  
Furthermore, there appeared to be a sizeable block of Republicans 
willing to support a Democratic amendment to rollback at least the 
broadcast cap rule, led by the influential chairman of the CJS 
subcommittee, Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA).  Attaching one or 
                                                          
 87. See Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743 (noting that an amendment could be 
considered on July 21). 
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more media ownership amendments to the CJS bill in committee 
might result in securing majority support on the floor, despite the 
opposition of House leadership.  Such a victory in the House would 
almost certainly produce a similar result in the Senate, where support 
for a rollback was even stronger.  GOP leaders moved to reign in 
their errant members and cut off this potential challenge before it 
could materialize. 
They had their first opportunity in the run-up to the full 
committee markup of the CJS appropriations bill in the House.  This 
was the first vote that mattered politically.  If House appropriations 
passed limitation amendments on FCC rules, the Senate would likely 
follow suit.  If they arrived at the President’s desk, it would place him 
in a difficult position.  Either he would use his first ever veto to reject 
a massive appropriations measure (which White House advisors had 
publicly recommended),88 or he would accept the media ownership 
reversals. Such a chain of events was certainly not guaranteed, but its 
very possibility made the House committee vote important.  The fact 
that rank-and-file House Republicans on that committee might be 
willing to support the amendments is nothing short of remarkable, 
given the repercussions it would visit upon their party leaders.  The 
only explanation is a sincere desire to open up the debate on the 
future of media policy to an entirely different set of principles. 
Representative Paul Gillmor (R-OH) summarized the situation he 
and his colleagues faced saying, “‘I have great respect for Billy Tauzin 
and Tom DeLay and Speaker Hastert.  But on this issue, I don’t agree 
with them.  I think the public interest is in the other position.’”89 
On the morning of July 16, the House Appropriations Committee 
met to consider the CJS Appropriations Bill.  In the audience portion 
of the committee hearing room were dozens of broadcast executives 
who had spent the previous two days pushing hard for a flat rejection 
of ownership amendments.  Representative Tauzin was in the halls 
that morning, leaning on Republicans to defeat the measure.  It 
seemed that the votes for rule reversal might not be there.  Yet, when 
ranking Democrat David Obey (D-WI) introduced an amendment to 
block the forty-five percent broadcast cap, a number of Republicans 
spoke up in support.  Eleven voted with the Democrats, and the rider 
passed forty to twenty-five.90  GOP committee members had voted 
                                                          
 88. Steinberg, supra note 58 (quoting White House spokeswoman Claire 
Buchan’s statement that “the president’s senior advisors would recommend a veto” if 
a bill including that amendment were presented reached the president). 
 89. Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743. 
 90. Now with Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast, July 25, 2003), at 
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their conscience, responding to the argument that concentrated 
broadcast ownership would reduce local control over programming.  
Representative Wolf commented later on his defection that, “I did 
not get elected to be a potted plant, and I don’t care what the White 
House thinks.”91  Representative Tauzin’s spokesman, Ken Johnson, 
acknowledged the defeat but predicted what was to come, saying, 
“[w]e may have one hand tied behind our back, but as long as we 
have one free hand, we can still swing a bat.”92 
CJS went to the floor on July 22.  The debate that afternoon was 
heated and the tactics complex.93  In the days between the markup 
and the floor vote, many insiders presumed that the Republican 
leaders would attempt to strip Representative Obey’s amendment 
from the bill and crush any further amendments offered to block the 
new rules on cross-ownership and local television mergers.  
Democrats raced to protect the rider that was already in the bill by 
reaching out to GOP supporters of Burr-Dingell.  They also 
discouraged liberal Democrats who wanted to offer a cross-ownership 
rider on the theory that reaching for two amendments might result in 
the loss of both in the eventual conference committee.  If all the 
chips were bet just on the Obey amendment, it might survive the 
process and become law.  The realities of the advancing legislation in 
the teeth of the majority leadership forced some Democrats to limit 
their goals to the reversal of the broadcast cap. 
The floor debate played out quite differently than expected.  The 
Republicans said nothing about the Obey amendment, presumably 
because they lacked the votes to remove it.  The debate then centered 
around an amendment, offered by Representatives Maurice Hinchey 
(D-NY), David Price (D-NC), and Jay Inslee (D-WA) (Hinchey 
amendment).  This amendment blocked the two other major rule 
changes, the lifting of the cross-ownership ban and the relaxation of 
limits on local TV mergers, in an effort to test how much support 
existed for a comprehensive rule reversal.94  Many members felt that 
without legislation addressing the cross-ownership rule, which would 
                                                          
American University Law Review). 
 91. CAPITOL BROADCASTING COMPANY, CONGRESS IMPLEMENTS TOOLS TO BLOCK 
FCC’S JUNE RULING, July 21, 2003, at http://www.cbc-raleigh.com/capcom/news/ 
2003/corporate_03/fcc_congress/fcc_congress.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (quotations omitted). 
 92. Brody Mullins, FCC Decision Dealt Big Blow, ROLL CALL, July 17, 2003, at 24. 
 93. See Understanding Tuesday’s House Vote, FREE PRESS, July 23, 2003 [hereinafter 
Tuesday’s House Vote], at http://chicagomediawatch.org/fcc_freepress.html (on file 
with the American University Law Review) (detailing the split between House 
Republicans and the President’s veto threat that preceded it). 
 94. Nichols, supra note 6, at 36. 
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produce far more sweeping changes in the media system than an 
increased broadcast cap, the heart of the debate would be lost.  They 
also assumed that the Hinchey amendment would fail for lack of 
Republican votes.  The question was by how much.  If it got 150 votes 
or more, then the House would have demonstrated respectable 
support for a full rollback and opened the door for Senate action on 
cross-ownership.  Less than 150 votes would all but end hope of 
reversal of the cross-ownership rule. 
In the hours before the vote, activist groups mobilized and 
launched the largest call-in campaign of the year.  Within two hours 
of the roll call, practically every phone in every House office was 
ringing.  It was an impressive scene, as Americans who had never 
heard of an appropriations rider called to demand that their 
representatives support one.  Representative David Price, moved by 
the action said in his speech on the House floor, “Mr. Chairman, in 
the history of media policy, there has never been a moment when the 
public was more engaged than they are right now.”95  Representative 
Edward Markey (D-MA), a twenty-seven-year veteran of the 
telecommunications subcommittee, blasted the FCC ruling in the 
harshest terms, calling it “the worst decision ever made by the Federal 
Communications Commission.”96 
Despite this show of support, the Democrats were divided.  
Representatives Obey and Dingell, key Democratic leaders, spoke 
against the Hinchey amendment during the floor debate.  They felt 
they had a winner if they marshaled all defenses around the 
broadcast cap, but a cross-ownership amendment would be a political 
overreach.  Representative Obey began his speech by praising the 
principles behind a full rule reversal, but he warned that “[t]he 
Hinchey amendment is not intended to be so, but it is a killer 
amendment.  It will load up the camel, and it will break the camel’s 
back.”97 
The Hinchey amendment was defeated 254 to 174.  Sixty 
Democrats voted against the amendment and thirty-four Republicans 
voted for it.98  Shockingly, had the Democrats held their ground, the 
measure would have passed easily.  Few Democrats thought that 
almost three dozen GOP members would vote for the amendment, 
yet they were now on the record.  Democratic tactics doomed the 
Hinchey amendment.  It was now clear that if a straight up-or-down 
                                                          
 95. 149 CONG. REC. H7280 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Price). 
 96. 149 CONG. REC. H7287 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
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vote on the full set of rules came to the House floor, a reversal would 
very likely succeed.  For the moment, the Hinchey amendment 
achieved a respectable vote tally, well above expectations.  Moreover, 
the renewed wave of public support emboldened reform-minded 
Senators who now saw that the cross-ownership issue was still in play. 
When the amended CJS bill passed the House by a vote of 400 to 
twenty-one, it made the front page of the New York Times and the 
Washington Post.99  The Democrats apparently stole a victory from the 
Republican leadership in the House.  What the Los Angeles Times 
described as a “sudden change in political currents” put the outcome 
of Chairman Powell’s rule changes in serious doubt.100  Several of the 
Democratic presidential candidates, including Howard Dean, John 
Edwards, John Kerry, and Dennis Kucinich, responded by publicly 
voicing support of more progressive media policy.101  But, this was not 
a case of purely liberal activism.  The White House renewed its veto 
threat, and the Republican leadership began to mobilize political 
defenses.102 
Throughout the next few weeks, while Congress was in recess, the 
political battle was waged in the press and in lobbying visits.  The 
NAB switched their position again.  Realizing that an appropriations 
rider on the broadcast cap would provide the one-rule-only reversal 
they could support, the association put their lobbying strength 
behind it.103  Troubled GOP leaders began circulating a letter 
promising the President that a veto of the media ownership rules 
would be sustained by the House.104  Knowing that 146 votes would 
block a veto override, the Republicans sought that number of 
supporters.  But the letter failed to solicit the required number of 
votes.105  A White House spokesman was unfazed saying, “‘In every 
instance the administration has issued a veto threat, the [offending] 
provision has been changed or dropped.’”106 
                                                          
 99. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Media Rule Blocked in House in a 400-to-21 Vote, N.Y. 
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 102. Frank James, Bush Threatens Veto to Keep FCC Changes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 
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In late July, the New York Times published an editorial by Chairman 
Powell attacking critics as misguided.107  On August 20, Chairman 
Powell announced that the FCC would be launching a “Localism in 
Broadcasting” initiative, a taskforce aimed at collecting public 
testimony on the local public service of broadcasters.108  Despite the 
apparent relevance of this initiative as a corrective to the furor over 
June 2, he declined to stay the rule changes.  Commissioner Copps 
called it “a policy of ‘ready, fire, aim!’”109  On the day Congress 
reconvened in early September, Republican pollster Frank Luntz 
released survey numbers in full page ads in the Capitol Hill 
newspapers.  His data, distributed to every congressional office, 
purported to show that the American public rejected government 
regulation of media.  His message stated that, “America Says:  Don’t 
Get Between Me and My TV.”110 
The political volume of FCC supporters was lowered substantially 
on that same day, September 3, by an event which almost no one 
predicted.  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an 
order in the case of Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.111  The suit, filed 
by a small group of community radio activists and argued by public 
interest attorneys of the Media Access Project, asked for a stay on the 
implementation of the media ownership rules.  FCC and industry 
lawyers for broadcasters such as Fox, NBC and Viacom, defended the 
rules.  The Court granted the stay.112  It was a stunning victory for the 
coalition of policy reformers.  The Wall Street Journal reported that the 
tiny non-profit law firm “bested legal teams from the FCC and three 
of the nation’s broadcast networks.”113  By earning a stay, the lawyers 
                                                          
 107. Michael K. Powell, New Rules, Old Rhetoric, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at A17 
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at Media Access Project opened a window for congressional action.  
Although the case would not be decided until at least the spring of 
2004, this legal win represented perhaps the single most successful 
effort of the reform campaign.  If the rules were implemented, the 
prospect for a legislative rollback or compromise would have 
dimmed.  It is one thing for Congress to nullify rule changes which 
remain hypothetical; it is quite another to reverse new ownership 
regulations that have already permitted further consolidation and 
mergers. 
On September 11, 2003 Senators Dorgan and Lott held a press 
conference to announce that they would force a vote on the CRA 
resolution of disapproval.114  MoveOn.org presented 300,000 petitions 
of support to the Senators to drive home the point.115  The debate 
began that afternoon and continued on September 16.  Senator John 
McCain, who would vote against the CRA in the end, nonetheless had 
this to say during the debate, “[i]n my time as chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, no issue has erupted so rapidly and evoked 
such passion from the public as media consolidation.”116  He 
concluded that the CRA would likely pass the Senate that day, but 
that it would die in the House.  Indeed, he chided, that may be why 
so many Senators felt that they could vote safely in favor of it.117 
The Senate CRA passed fifty-five to forty.  The New York Times 
described the vote as a “stinging political rebuke of Michael K. 
Powell” while quoting Chairman Powell as describing the vote as 
“‘bordering on the absurd.’”118  Chairman Powell complained that 
“there was a concerted grass-roots effort to attack the commission 
from the outside in.”119  Indeed, as over two million members citizens 
from a broad cross-section of society contacted Washington 
regulators and lawmakers to voice their protest.  This was the high-
water mark for the effort to reverse the rules. 
Given the political unlikelihood of the House leadership bringing 
the Senate CRA resolution to a vote, members of Congress assumed 
                                                          
 114. See James, supra note 102, at C10. 
 115. Senators Lott and Dorgan hold news conference calling for rollback of FCC media 
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that the fifty-five to forty record would serve to put considerable 
pressure on the most viable of the three legislative strategies to pass a 
rollback of the FCC rules; the CJS appropriations bill.  On September 
4, the Senate Appropriations Committee quietly approved the CJS 
bill.  It did not even vote on an FCC rider.  Senator Stevens attached 
the broadcast cap reversal as a manager’s amendment before it came 
before the committee, using precisely the same language as the 
House bill to make it more difficult to strip it out in the conference 
committee.120  Members understood that Senator Dorgan would offer 
his cross-ownership amendment when the CJS bill was debated on the 
floor.  Since fifty-five votes had been collected for a nullification of 
the entire June 2 ruling, it was thought probable that the votes could 
be gathered to pass such an amendment.  It was, however, far from 
certain whether any amendments concerning the FCC, much less a 
cross-ownership amendment passed only by the Senate, could survive 
a conference committee under heavy pressure from the White House 
to remove the language. 
As the fall wore on, the Senate CJS bill looked increasingly unlikely 
to even have a floor vote.  Its fate was wrapped up together with 
several other controversial spending bills in an omnibus package.  
The omnibus carries the weight of a must-pass bill.  But, the bill 
would have little opportunity for further amendment since Senator 
Dorgan would not have the chance to offer an amendment blocking 
cross-ownership.  Further, the omnibus negotiations would allow 
much stronger influence from the White House as even the broadcast 
cap was in danger of being stripped out.  In the back channels of 
Senate power, the tides were turning against reform legislation. 
When appropriations negotiations languished in October, 
attention returned to the CRA—which was then on the Speaker’s 
desk in the House—GOP leadership called the resolution “dead on 
arrival.”121  As McCain predicted, the CRA was turning into a 
showpiece vote, not a substantive action.  But, the House was not 
finished.  Led once again by Representatives Sanders and Hinchey, a 
new coalition was cobbled together.  The goal was to get signatures 
on a letter to the Speaker of the House calling for an immediate vote 
on the Senate CRA.  House rules placed the decision in the Speaker’s 
hands as to whether a vote would be held or not. Once more a public 
call-in campaign encouraged members to sign on.  By late October, 
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Talk Radio, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 29, 2003, at 17 (quoting House majority leader 
Tom DeLay) (quotations omitted). 
SCOTT.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 4/29/2004  6:55 PM 
2004] THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP 673 
205 members of the House, including eleven Republicans, signed the 
letter in support of a vote on the measure.122  Though 205 votes is 
short of the 218 required majority, it was a clear statement to the 
leadership that the resolution would pass if it were to have a vote.  Many 
of the thirty-four Republican votes cast in July in favor of the Hinchey 
amendment could be counted on for the CRA.  The formerly divided 
Democrats were now all but fully aligned behind a comprehensive 
reversal.  Consequently, Representative Hastert declined to bring the 
CRA to the House floor.  It would remain on his desk when the 
session ended in December.  Supporters vowed to introduce a House 
version of the CRA and force a vote using a discharge petition in 
2004.123 
Meanwhile, with the issue back in the limelight, the pressure was 
on the Senate appropriators to hold the line on the thirty-five percent 
broadcast cap in the omnibus bill, which finally entered the closing 
stages of consideration on a lengthy conference report.  Bipartisan 
conferees agreed to keep the language in the bill.  But, at the 
eleventh hour in late November, Senator Stevens met with White 
House counsel and reopened the issue.  They emerged with a new 
deal.  Senator Hollings (D-SC) blasted the action stating:  “The 
Republicans went into a closet, met with themselves, and announced 
a ‘compromise.’ . . .  It was a total violation of the conference 
agreement.”124 
The new deal went beyond adjusting percentages.  The broadcast 
cap would be set at thirty-nine percent permanently, not as a one-year 
appropriations rider.  Further, the FCC’s biennial review period 
would be extended to quadrennial, thus easing the burden of 
constant review.  The new thirty-nine percent rule would no longer 
be considered in these reviews.  These provisions, in and of 
themselves, seemed a positive solution.  However, there appeared to 
be loopholes.  Any company could violate the thirty-nine percent 
limit for two years without penalty before being forced to sell stations, 
up from a standard of six to twelve months.  Moreover, the FCC’s 
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authority to grant a waiver to the thirty-nine percent was not explicitly 
removed.  Indeed, the new legislative language was written in such a 
way as to make unclear who had the legal authority to change the 
rule.125 
Critics of the new language charged that it provided the pretense 
of public interest regulation while signaling to the industry that 
consolidation could proceed.  Some critics questioned the thirty-nine 
percent limit.  Viacom and News Corp. stood in violation of the thirty-
five percent limit, at thirty-nine percent and thirty-eight percent, 
respectively.126  The compromise simply legalized the status quo, and 
the NAB endorsed it.127  Rupert Murdoch, the iconic leader of News 
Corp., acknowledged that the deal “‘suits us just fine.’”128 
Conversely, the thirty-nine percent compromise satisfied few 
others.  Critics viewed it as a carefully tailored solution that fit the 
needs of powerful corporations.  It contained loopholes that 
suggested the “permanency” of the limit was temporary.129  It did not 
address the more substantial rule changes, cross-ownership and local 
television consolidation.  Moreover, the process was heavily political.  
Essentially, two powerful Republicans colluded and came to an 
arrangement, without consulting with anyone, much less a vote 
before a relevant committee.  Additionally, there was little in this 
solution which spoke to the new policy directives sought by the 
coalition.  This was a top-down solution which massaged the details of 
technocratic regulation for political purposes, not a reevaluation of 
the process and principles behind public accountability in ownership 
rules.  Many critics found it hard to avoid the conclusion that money 
won out over the public interest in this contest, especially since the 
broadcasters walked away with a reasonable deal and the public was 
left with next to nothing. 
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Despite considerable opposition, the omnibus bill containing the 
thirty-nine percent deal passed the House on December 8, 2003.130  
The media ownership rules were a sticking point in the debate, but 
the omnibus carried so many contentious issues that the failure of 
this compromise was only a part of the chorus of dissent.  The Senate 
did not consider the omnibus bill before closing the session for the 
year due to intense conflict over the legislation.  The Senate will 
consider it in late January 2004, but its passage is by no means 
certain.  Numerous provisions in the bill have provoked opposition, 
particularly those concerning the thirty-nine percent compromise.  
Senator Dorgan fumed:  “I, and others who have fought so hard to 
overturn these rules, will not sit quietly by while the White House 
insists on provisions that are counter to the public’s interest.”131 
CONCLUSION 
Heading into 2004, the legislative vehicles for reversing the FCC’s 
media ownership rules are all still alive.  Burr-Dingell and the Sanders 
bill sit in committee with 194 and 100 cosponsors, respectively.  
Stevens-Hollings, with forty-seven cosponsors, is out of committee and 
awaits floor consideration.  A House version of the CRA resolution 
has been introduced and it promises to be advanced aggressively by 
frustrated supporters.132  And, of course, the omnibus appropriations 
bill must still move through the Senate.  All of these are likely to kick 
up considerable political dust in the first few months of 2004.  
However, none of these are particularly likely to bear fruit as 
substantial reversals of the FCC rules or as major changes of policy 
direction in the short term.  The thirty-nine percent compromise will 
likely withstand pressure from both sides and remain as it is in the 
final bill.  Only the pending court case in the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit is likely to stop the FCC rules from going into effect 
next year. 
The difficulty of passing the rollback and the circuitous methods of 
appropriations and the resolution of disapproval belie the political 
realities of Congress.  Good policy with majority support has no 
guarantee of passage if the leadership stands opposed.  Recall that 
the reversal of media concentration is an issue that the vast majority 
of Americans agree on.  It is not a partisan issue.  It is hardly 
                                                          
 130. 149 CONG. REC. H12,845 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. Bill 
Young).  
 131. Ahrens, supra note 126, at E1 (quotations omitted). 
 132. H.R.J. Res. 72, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was introduced by Rep. Maurice 
Hinchey and has fifty-five cosponsors. 
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contentious.  It is the subject of debate in the Congress only because 
powerful interests stand to lose a great deal of money if the public’s 
work is done.  Yet, the House leadership derailed the measure 
without too much difficulty.  As the Speaker of the House expressed 
in a recent speech: 
Sometimes, we have a hard time convincing the majority of the 
House to vote like a majority of the House, . . . On occasion, a 
particular issue might excite a majority made up mostly of the 
minority. . . . The job of Speaker is not to expedite legislation that 
runs counter to the wishes of the majority of his majority.133 
On the question of media ownership, as well as almost every other 
issue in the first session of the 108th Congress, he found a way to 
leverage political power to defeat policy opponents. 
Does this mean that a progressive media reform is dead in the long 
term?  Quite the opposite.  What happened in the last six months of 
2003 was nothing short of a transformation in the nature of media 
policy making because there is now an actual debate on the topic.  
There is a bona fide alternative policy position which emanates from 
a new, publicly vitalized agenda of public service standards and 
market controls.  Millions of Americans participated in the debate 
and convinced the majority of members of Congress that the 
prevailing trends of concentrated power in the media system should 
be reversed.  What this issue accomplished in six months usually takes 
years on Capitol Hill.  That the reformers did not achieve a legislative 
victory was a matter of politics. 
Politics cannot stop this issue from recurring in the next session of 
Congress or undo the exposure of the FCC’s practice of conducting 
important media policy debates behind closed doors and outside the 
public debate.  Nor can politics prevent the energy and public 
attention spawned in the media ownership campaign from spilling 
over into other media issues, such as low-power radio, Internet 
governance, public service obligations for digital broadcasting, 
children’s programming, free political airtime, and a host of other 
topics from spectrum allocation to copyright reform.  According to 
the trade publication Communications Daily, industry analysts, political 
insiders, and public service advocates all agree on one thing after the 
ownership fight, “it seems clear that the impact of the issue on 
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Capitol Hill has surprised many and seems likely to carry over into 
other media issues.”134 
                                                          
 134. Terry Lane & Michael Feazel, Cause Celeb—Media Ownership Issue Could Have 
Long Legacy, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 8, 2003, 2003 WL 5755999. 
